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Chapter 15 
Applying the Capability Approach in Health Economic 
Evaluations 
A Sufficient Solution 
Paul Mark Mitchell, Tracy E. Roberts, Pelham M. Barton, and Joanna Coast 
1. Introduction 
Economic evaluation is an analytic approach used to weigh the costs and consequences of 
interventions competing for the same resources. It provides a systematic way of dealing 
with scarcity, a core economic concept meaning that there are an unlimited number of 
wants to provide within a finite amount of resources. In health care, scarcity plays an 
important role, with limits on how many doctors, nurses, hospitals, and interventions can 
be provided within available resources. Economic evaluations in health have evolved in 
the past half century to help achieve the aims of a health care system in an efficient 
manner. Specifying the aims of a health care system and determining the meaning of 
efficiency for each health care system, however, involve normative judgments that are 
likely to vary across jurisdictions and societies. Although the standard health economic 
evaluation approach focuses on an objective that aims to maximize population health, 
there is enduring debate as to the appropriateness of this objective. A new approach 
emerging as an alternative is the use of the capability approach, developed by Amartya 
Sen. In this chapter, we aim to show how economic evaluation in health has developed 
over time, and we discuss its core tenets and underlying assumptions. We then present a 
new way of conducting economic evaluation based on people’s capabilities. We call this 
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alternative the sufficient capability approach and present an illustrative example of the 
approach. Although the work presented in this chapter has been primarily developed in 
the UK context, the potential application of the sufficient capability approach is not 
restricted to any jurisdiction. 
2. Health Economics and Health Economic Evaluation: Overview 
The study of the economics of health and health care has grown significantly in 
approximately the past 50 years, ever since Kenneth Arrow wrote his seminal paper on 
the welfare economics of medical care in 1963, setting out the need for a different 
approach in economic analysis when assessing the provision of health care.1 Health 
economics has developed a number of unique methods for measuring the benefits of 
health interventions, which are, for the most part, focused on the quantification of health 
benefits from interventions. 
The role of health economic evaluations in aiding decision-making has grown 
significantly in approximately the past 15 years, with increasing application of economic 
evaluations in developing countries as well.2 This can be partly attributed to the 
foundation of the English advisory body for health guidance, the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE), in 1999. Since then, NICE has stipulated the 
requirement for economic evaluations for selected new interventions to be conducted 
                                                          
1 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,” 
American Economic Review 53, no. 5 (1963): 941–973. 
2 Peter J. Neumann et al., “The Changing Face of the Cost-Utility Literature, 1990–
2012,” Value in Health 18, no. 2 (2015): 271–277. 
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before they can be recommended for use within the National Health Service.3 This 
requirement has led to a significant increase in the use of economic evaluations within the 
United Kingdom, and the use of health economic evaluations is increasing globally also.4 
2.1. Theories Underpinning Health Economic Evaluation 
2.1.1. Welfarism 
Alongside the numerous definitions used to define economics, welfarism is a term that 
has many interpretations, and it has hence been applied in a variety of ways. When 
referring to welfarism, welfarist, or welfare economics, we mean the interpretation as 
noted by Sen as a focus on individual utilities only, in terms of desire and satisfaction 
based on people’s preferences.5 Welfare economics is the standard theoretical framework 
in areas such as environmental economics and transport economics,6 and it is the 
theoretical basis for the majority of economic evaluations applied in public policy by the 
UK government.7 
                                                          
3 NICE, Developing NICE Guidelines: The Manual (London: National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence, 2014). 
4 Neumann et al. “The Changing Face.” 
5 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 12–30. 
6 See, for example, Nick Hanley and Edward B. Barbier, Pricing Nature: Cost–Benefit 
Analysis and Environmental Policy (Cheltenham, UK: Elgar 2009); Kenneth Button, 
Recent Development in Transport Economics (Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, 2003). 
7 HM Treasury, “The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government” 
(London: The Stationary Office, 2003). 
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There are four key principles on which welfarism attempts to achieve economic 
efficiency.8 The first principle is known as utilitarianism. Utilitarianism assumes that 
each individual in society is a rational agent. Under utilitarianism, individuals order their 
options so that they achieve their optimum or highest possible level of utility or 
preferences. 
The second principle of welfarism is individualism. Under individualism, 
individuals themselves are thought to be the best judges of how to maximize their utility, 
with a laissez-faire approach from the state that permits utility maximization by 
individuals. 
Consequentialism is the third principle. Under consequentialism, the outcome of 
choices made by individuals is the only consideration for assessing their goodness. The 
means by which the ends or outcomes are reached are deemed irrelevant. 
The final principle is welfarism. Welfarism can be defined in many different 
ways, but the principal tenet of welfarism is concerned with the judgment that the 
goodness of states be based only on the aggregation of individual utility. 
                                                          
8 Four principles of welfarism are drawn from Jeremiah Hurley, “Welfarism, Extra-
welfarism and Evaluative Economic Analysis,” in Health, Healthcare and Health 
Economics: Perspectives on Distribution, ed. Morris L. Barer, Thomas E. Getzen, and 
Greg L. Stoddart (Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1998), 373–395; Jeremiah Hurley, “An 
Overview of the Normative Economics of the Health Sector,” in Handbook of Health 
Economics Vol. 1, Part A, ed. Anthony J. Culyer and Joseph P. Newhouse (Oxford: 
North-Holland, 2000), 55–118. 
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The main type of economic evaluation arising from the theoretical basis of 
welfare economics is cost–benefit analysis (CBA). The main aim of CBA is to compare 
interventions by valuing the costs and benefits of different interventions or treatments, 
usually in monetary terms.9 CBA plays a major role in aiding decision-making in areas 
concerning transport and other areas across the public sector, such as environment and 
education projects.10 The use of CBA in health care, however, remains somewhat on the 
periphery of decision-making, due at least in part to the difficulty attached to the direct 
monetary valuation of a life.11,12 
CBA focuses on allocative efficiency—that is, the overall impact of a project 
across the society in which resources are being allocated. This means that when CBA is 
applied within the health service, all health and non-health-related costs and benefits are, 
in welfarist theory, accounted for within monetary outcomes known as willingness to pay 
(WTP). Assuming costs are the same for providing different interventions, the option that 
produces the highest net benefit, judged by how much people are willing to pay for 
                                                          
9 Michael F. Drummond et al., Methods for the Economic Evaluation of Health Care 
Programmes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 211–214. 
10 Amiram Gafni, “Economic Evaluation of Health-Care Programmes: Is CEA Better 
Than CBA?” Environmental & Resource Economics 34, no. 3. (2006): 407–418. 
11 Joanna Coast, “Is Economic Evaluation in Touch with Society’s Health Values,” 
British Medical Journal 329, no. 7476 (2004): 1234. 
12 For recent developments in CBA for health, see Emma McIntosh et al., Applied 
Methods of Cost–Benefit Analysis in Health Care (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
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different interventions, is the option that produces the optimal allocation. Allocative 
efficiency allows for comparison of welfare across multiple interventions for different 
population groups.13 Practical examples of allocative efficiency studies linked with the 
CBA framework within health care include comparing helicopter ambulance services, 
heart operations and hip replacements,14 and mental health care compared to cancer and 
elderly care.15 
A major issue with the application of CBA within a health care setting is the 
monetary valuation of the benefits of health improvements to human life, thereby directly 
or indirectly leading to a monetary value on a human life.16 However, many economists 
believe it is the best way of evaluating outcomes because it is grounded within welfare 
economic theory, the predominant theory of economic practice. New methods of valuing 
                                                          
13 Stephen Palmer and David J. Torgerson, “Definitions of Efficiency,” British Medical 
Journal 318, no. 7191 (1999): 1136. 
14 Jan A. Olsen and Cam Donaldson, “Helicopters, Hearts and Hips: Using Willingness to 
Pay to Set Priorities for Public Sector Health Care Programmes,” Social Science & 
Medicine 46, no. 1 (1998): 1–12. 
15 Eamon O’Shea, Brenda Gannon, and Brendan Kennelly, “Eliciting Preferences for 
Resource Allocation in Mental Health Care in Ireland,” Health Policy 88, no. 2–3 (2008): 
359–370. 
16 James C. Robinson, “Philosophical Origins of the Economic Valuation of Life,” 
Milbank Quarterly 64, no. 1 (1986): 133–155. 
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improvements in health in monetary terms continue to be made to further develop this 
type of evaluation for health care.17 
2.1.2. Extra-welfarism 
The application of the normative theoretical framework of welfarism to a health care 
setting is controversial because there are a number of principles in welfarism that 
arguably conflict with the nature of health care. The principle underlying welfarism that 
has been most strongly challenged within health economics is that of utilitarianism—that 
is, relying solely on utility information to judge individual well-being. The theoretical 
critique of welfarism for use in health care has been drawn primarily from the critique of 
utility as a basis for assessing societal welfare by Amartya Sen.18 In his critique of 
welfare economics, Sen referred to capturing additional information beyond individual 
utility as extra-welfarist. From this critique, and from Culyer’s subsequent developments 
in the health context,19 the term extra-welfarist has become associated with the health 
economics alternative to welfarism. 
Brouwer and colleagues identified four ways in which extra-welfarism can be 
distinguished from welfare economic theory.20 First, extra-welfarism permits the use of 
                                                          
17 McIntosh et al., Applied Methods. 
18 Amartya Sen, “Social Choice Theory: A Re-examination,” Econometrica 45, no. 1 
(1977): 53–89. 
19 Anthony J. Culyer, “The Normative Economics of Health Care Finance and 
Provision,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 5, no. 1 (1989): 34–58. 
20 Werner B. F. Brouwer et al., “Welfarism vs. Extra-welfarism,” Journal of Health 
Economics 27, no. 2 (2008): 325–338. 
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non-utility outcomes. Given that the focus in the health care sector is on improving 
health, Brouwer and colleagues argue that a sole focus on utility is too narrow for health 
analysis and in theory attempts to complement utility with non-utility information. The 
primary normative framework for extra-welfarism in health economics is mainly based 
on incorporating information beyond utility into outcome measurement for health care 
provision, although in practice the focus is on health status,21 such as the quality-adjusted 
life-year (QALY), a composite measure of health and duration (see Section 3). 
Second, extra-welfarism allows for the valuation of outcomes from those not 
directly affected by the outcome of interest. Within extra-welfarism, a number of 
different population groups could be considered relevant for valuing outcomes and not, as 
within the welfarist tradition, just the individuals directly affected. Such alternative 
values can be appropriate within state provision of health care. For example, where the 
general population is funding the treatment of those who receive treatment, it could be 
argued that they are stakeholders in the benefit obtained from such interventions and 
should be involved in the valuation of outcomes.22 
Third, Brouwer and colleagues consider extra-welfarism to be different from 
welfarism because it allows the weighting of outcomes to be based on factors other than 
individual preferences. For example, different weights could be applied based on 
sociodemographic characteristics of the individuals receiving the intervention, or 
                                                          
21 Culyer, “The Normative Economics,” 34–58. 
22 Marthe R. Gold et al., Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 1–303. 
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additional weight could be added if priority was advocated for a particular patient group 
(e.g., children). 
Finally, extra-welfarism is different from welfarism because it permits 
interpersonal comparison in a number of dimensions of well-being. This means that, for 
example, this framework allows comparisons between the health (or well-being) of 
different people. 
Although it has been argued that there are a number of differences between the 
extra-welfarist and welfarist frameworks, a number of similarities in the applications of 
the two theories remain. The objective within the extra-welfarist framework remains 
consequential in evaluation, in terms of maximization, mirroring the same form of 
consequentialism as applied in welfarism. The only difference is what is maximized, with 
the maximization of utility in welfarism replaced with the maximization of health in 
extra-welfarism.23 Whereas the extra-welfarist framework argues for the 
multidimensionality of outcomes to be accounted for within evaluation, the practical 
application of extra-welfarism focuses on a single dimension—that is, health status.24 
This is particularly true within the extra-welfarist theoretical framework currently applied 
within health economics, in which the objective of the maximization of health using 
health-related outcomes is the primary objective of interest.25 
                                                          
23 Jeremiah Hurley, “Welfarism, Extra-welfarism,” 373–395. 
24 Jeremiah Hurley, “Welfarism, Extra-welfarism,” 373–395; Joanna Coast, Richard D. 
Smith, and Paula Lorgelly, “Welfarism, Extra-welfarism and Capability: The Spread of 
Ideas in Health Economics,” Social Science & Medicine 67, no. 7 (2008): 1190–1198. 
25 Anthony J. Culyer, “The Normative Economics,” 34–58. 
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Cost–utility analysis (CUA) is a type of economic evaluation that focuses 
attention particularly on health-related outcomes for health care treatments (note that the 
terminology here is at odds with the nature of the analysis).26 CUA is the main evaluation 
framework of the extra-welfarist theory for health care as developed by Culyer. Culyer 
believed that the maximand (what is to be maximized) for evaluation conducted under 
extra-welfarism should be health.27 Although utility is referred to within the title of CUA, 
it is not utility as is commonly interpreted within welfare economics. Measures of generic 
health-related quality of life (HRQoL) rely on preferences of individuals to value a 
generic health state in comparison to the anchors of full health and a state equivalent to 
being dead.28 The index scores generated from HRQoL questionnaires are then combined 
with length of time to form a QALY, which is used as the outcome of benefit from 
economic evaluation and provides the reference case outcome measure for NICE 
evaluations.29 
The CUA evaluation framework requires a consistent HRQoL outcome measure 
to be applied across all interventions evaluated so that decisions can be made that address 
not only technical efficiency between treatment options for the same health condition but 
also allocative efficiency across interventions so that funding can be justified in 
                                                          
26 Drummond et al., Economic Evaluation, 137–139. 
27 Anthony J. Culyer, “The Normative Economics,” 54–55. 
28 Paul Dolan et al., A Social Tariff for EuroQol: Results from a UK General Population 
Survey (York, UK: Centre for Health Economics, 1995). 
29 NICE, Developing NICE Guidelines, 123. 
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comparison with any other treatment across the health service.30 This is of particular 
importance in a publicly funded health care system in which decisions should ensure that 
resources are appropriately allocated to different areas of the health service so that 
taxpayers are getting value for money.31 
3. Extra-welfarism in Practice 
The extra-welfarist framework has become synonymous with one health outcome 
measure in particular: the quality-adjusted life-year. The QALY as it was defined first in 
197732 has changed relatively little over time.33 The QALY takes account of quality of 
life in terms of both health (quality or Q) and length of life (i.e., life-years or LY). The 
quality part of the QALY is measured on a scale with the common anchoring of full 
health anchored to 1 and health states equivalent to being dead anchored to 0.34 The 
quality part of the QALY is collected over time and combined with time spent in each 
health state to measure QALYs, where 1 QALY is equivalent to 1 year in full health. 
When applied to patient populations, the QALY seeks to find the additional health benefit 
                                                          
30 Palmer and Torgerson, “Definitions of Efficiency,” 1136. 
31 Karen Gerard, “Setting Priorities in the New NHS: Can Purchasers Use Cost–Utility 
Information,” Health Policy 25, no. 1–2 (1993): 109–125. 
32 Milton C. Weinstein and William B. Stason, “Foundations of Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis for Health and Medical Practices,” New England Journal of Medicine 296, no. 3 
(1977): 716–721. 
33 F. Reed Johnson, “Moving the QALY Forward or Just Stuck in Traffic?” Value in 
Health 12, no. s1 (2009): 38–39. 
34 Drummond et al., Economic Evaluation, 14. 
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of receiving a new treatment in comparison to an alternative by measuring the change in 
quality and quantity of life if a new treatment were introduced.35 
To determine the quality part of the QALY, two questions need to be answered: 
What attributes of quality need to be valued? and How are these attributes to be valued?36 
Both of these are addressed next. 
3.1. What Attributes to Value? 
To calculate what is to be valued in the QALY, a generic measure of health status is 
usually collected from patients. The main method recommended by NICE for measuring 
quality for QALYs is the EuroQol (EQ-5D).37 The EQ-5D is a five-item questionnaire of 
health status that assesses mobility, self-care, usual activities, pain/discomfort, and 
anxiety/depression.38 The dimensions on the EQ-5D were originally developed on three 
levels (no problems, some problems, and a lot of problems on a given dimension). The 
EQ-5D has been expanded to a five-level version, the EQ-5D-5L.39 
3.2. How Are the Attributes Valued? 
                                                          
35 Milton C. Weinstein, George Torrance, and Alistair McGuire, “QALYs: The Basics,” 
Value in Health 12, no. s1 (2009): 5–9. 
36 Paul Dolan et al., “Valuing Health Directly,” British Medical Journal 339 (2009): 
b2577. 
37 NICE, Developing NICE Guidelines, 123. 
38 Richard Brooks, “EuroQol: The Current State of Play,” Health Policy 37, no. 1 (1996): 
53–72. 
39 Michael Herdman et al., “Development and Preliminary Testing of the New Five-Level 
Version of EQ-5D (EQ-5D-5L),” Quality of Life Research 20, no. 10 (2011): 1727–1736. 
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Generic health status instruments need to be valued. NICE stipulates that the method for 
valuing between different health states must be choice based.40 Thus, rating scales of 
health such as the EuroQol Visual Analogue Scale (EQ-VAS), a scale of 0 (worst health 
state imaginable) to 100 (best health state imaginable), cannot be used to value health 
states because respondents are not presented with a choice (i.e., preference of one health 
state over another) in the task. Preferences for health states are used to compare different 
interventions to represent a societal value of changes in health status.41 
For the EQ-5D-3L, the values associated with each of the 245 possible health 
states (35 or 243 health states and 2 additional health states for “unconscious” and 
“dead”) were generated in the United Kingdom by Dolan from a representative sample of 
the general UK adult population.42 These preferences were elicited using the time trade-
off (TTO) technique developed by Torrance and colleagues to generate health 
preferences between quality and quantity of life. The TTO method asks participants how 
much quantity of life they are willing to trade off in a worse state of full health (i.e., <1) 
to improve their quality of life to its optimum level of full health.43 
                                                          
40 NICE, Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal (London: National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence, 2013), 43. 
41 Drummond et al., Economic Evaluation, 143–147. 
42 Paul Dolan, “Modeling Valuations for EuroQol Health States,” Medical Care 35, no. 
11 (1997): 1095–1108. 
43 George W. Torrance, Warren H. Thomas, and David L. Sackett, “A Utility 
Maximisation Model for Evaluation of Health Care Programs,” Health Services Research 
7, no. 2 (1972): 118–133. 
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Once a health status questionnaire has been completed to give a profile of an 
individual for a given condition, values are then assigned to the patient profile to generate 
an index score for that state of being.44 Index scores for individual health states can then 
be combined with the length of period a given individual spends within this health state 
to calculate the QALY. For example, an individual who scores an EQ-5D score of 0.5 
and is in this health state for 1 year generates 0.5 QALY. 
A number of alternatives to the QALY have been suggested within the health 
economics literature. The most well-known of these is the disability-adjusted life-year 
(DALY), which has been the measure of choice for assessing the global burden of disease 
by the World Health Organization (WHO) since the early 1990s.45 The calculation of 
QALYs and that of DALYs are somewhat similar. However, the objective of maximizing 
health within the QALY approach is substituted in the DALY approach by minimizing 
disease burden through reducing DALYs lost. The DALY has been developed to assess 
population health primarily within developing countries, which is easier to measure 
where information on HRQoL may not be easily accessible. The DALY provides more 
information than mortality data alone. Relatively recently, new economic evaluation 
                                                          
44 Drummond et al., Economic Evaluation, 155–156. 
45 Christopher Murray and Alan Lopez, The Global Burden of Disease: A Comprehensive 
Assessment of Mortality and Disability from Diseases, Injuries and Risk Factors in 1990 
and Projected to 2020 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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guidelines have been developed to improve the reporting of economic evaluations in 
developing countries.46 
3.3. Decision Rules 
A number of decision rules can, in theory, be used to aid health care decision-making. 
Decision rules are generally based on aiding decision-making as to whether new 
interventions are worth the additional cost burden to the funding or implementing body in 
question (e.g., hospital and regional or national provision). For NICE, QALY scores are 
aggregated for the population under consideration, with the costs and benefits combined 
by calculating a cost-effectiveness ratio or cost per QALY gained. To compare 
differences between costs and effects for competing interventions, the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER) is applied to measure the cost per additional QALY gained for 
the more expensive and/or effective treatments.47 The ICER for a given treatment is then 
compared with a shadow price for the budget of interest. This is known as the threshold 
ICER rule. For new interventions to be recommended by NICE, the willingness to pay for 
an additional QALY must fall within or below the threshold range of £20,000–£30,000. 
However, in exceptional circumstances, the willingness to pay for QALY gains is 
sometimes raised above the £30,000 threshold.48 A recent study suggested that 82% of 
NICE decisions can be predicted by the prevailing threshold ICER rule of less than 
                                                          
46 Karl Claxton et al., The Gates Reference Case for Economic Evaluation (Seattle, WA: 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 2014). 
47 Michael F. Drummond et al., Economic Evaluation, 40. 
48 NICE, Developing NICE Guidelines, 146. 
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£30,000 per QALY gain.49 However, a number of health economists have argued that the 
NICE threshold is too high and should instead be set at £13,000 per QALY gain.50 
Another alternative for decision-making using these ICERs is the “QALY league 
table,” in which interventions with the lowest ICERs are recommended until no more 
resources are available.51 This approach has been previously applied within the United 
States.52 However, the league table approach came under heavy scrutiny,53 which led to 
the ICER threshold rule as the current dominant method for comparing interventions in 
health economics. The aim of both approaches, however, is to maximize QALY gains for 
the scarce resources available, irrespective of distributional concerns. 
                                                          
49 Helen Dakin et al., “The Influence of Cost-Effectiveness and Other Factors on NICE 
Decisions,” Health Economics 24, no.10 (2015), 1256-1271. 
50 Karl Claxton et al., “Methods for the Estimation of the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence Cost-Effectiveness Threshold,” Health Technology Assessment 19, 
no. 14 (2015): 73–78. 
51 Stephen Birch and Ariman Gafni, “Decision Rules in Economic Evaluation,” in The 
Elgar Companion to Health Economics, ed. Andrew Jones (Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, 
2006), 492–502. 
52 David C. Hadorn, “Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness Meets 
the Rule of Rescue,” JAMA 216, no. 17 (1991): 2218–2225. 
53 For example, see Michael Drummond, George Torrance, and James Mason, “Cost-
Effectiveness League Tables: More Harm Than Good?” Social Science & Medicine 37, 
no. 1 (1993): 33–40; Karen Gerard and Gavin Mooney, “QALY League Tables: Handle 
with Care,” Health Economics 2, no. 1 (1993): 59–64. 
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4. Critiquing the QALY 
The QALY has faced a number of criticisms since it was developed concerning both the 
theoretical assumptions underpinning the outcome measure54 and the considerations that 
are overlooked within the measure.55 
There are a number of theoretical arguments against the use of the QALY 
outcome for measuring the benefits from health interventions. One such argument is the 
focus on changes in individual health status only, rather than a more holistic measure of 
individual welfare that would capture the broader benefits to individual well-being from 
health care. The health QALY also limits the generalizability to compare the benefits to 
society with other public interventions, such as education, justice, and transport. Even if 
it accepted that health maximization is an intuitive objective for health services, there are 
many practical examples concerning social care,56 end-of-life care,57 process of care,58 
                                                          
54 For example, see Roy A. Carr-Hill, “Assumptions of the QALY Procedure,” Social 
Science & Medicine 29, no. 3 (1989): 469–477; Graham Loomes and Lynda McKenzie, 
“The Use of QALYs in Health Care Decision Making,” Social Science & Medicine 29, 
no. 3 (1989): 299–308. 
55 Erik Nord, Cost–Value Analysis in Health Care: Making Sense Out of QALYs 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
56 Hareth Al-Janabi, Terry N. Flynn, and Joanna Coast, “QALYs and Carers,” 
Pharmacoeconomics 29, no. 12 (2011): 1015–1023. 
57 Charles Normand, “Measuring Outcomes in Palliative Care: Limitations of QALYs 
and the Road to PaLYs,” Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 38, no. 1 (2009): 
27–31. 
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and complex interventions59 in which QALY maximization proves problematic. Indeed, 
there is doubt as to how much the objective of QALY maximization is reflective of 
societal values.60 
An alternative proposal to the welfarist (through WTP) and extra-welfarist 
(through HRQoL and QALYs) approaches to measuring benefits is the capability 
approach. The capability approach, developed originally by Amartya Sen,61 is a 
prominent critique of standard welfare economic theory. Sen argues that standard welfare 
economic theory is used to evaluate societal well-being through a narrow focus on a 
person’s utility levels. 
The first attempt following Culyer to incorporate the capability approach within a 
health economic evaluation format was by Cookson, although it has been previously 
                                                                                                                                                                             
58 Victoria K. Brennan and Simon Dixon, “Incorporating Process Utility into Quality 
Adjusted Life Years: A Systematic Review of Empirical Studies,” Pharmacoeconomics 
31, no. 8 (2013): 677–691. 
59 Katherine Payne, Marion McAllister, and Linda M. Davies, “Valuing the Economic 
Benefits of Complex Interventions: When Maximising Health Is Not Sufficient,” Health 
Economics 22, no. 3 (2013): 258–271. 
60 Paul Dolan et al., “QALY Maximisation and People’s Preferences: A Methodological 
Review of the Literature,” Health Economics 14, no. 2 (2005): 197–208. 
61 Although there are numerous writings by Sen on the capability approach, see Amartya 
Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Lane, 2009); see also chapters in this volume by Fourie 
(Chapter 10) and Ram-Tiktin (Chapter 8) for more detailed discussion on the theory 
underpinning the capability approach. 
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suggested as an alternative to HRQoL measures. Cookson and, recently, Bleichrodt and 
Quiggin have argued for a formulation of QALYs as a measure that reflects the capability 
approach.62 However, others have argued that the objectives of maximizing health and 
measuring “more than health” are key rationales for moving away from the current 
QALY approach in health economics.63 Specific areas in which health care resources are 
allocated that have argued for a broader assessment than health include social care,64 
public health,65 mental health,66 palliative care,67 and chronic pain.68 
                                                          
62 Richard Cookson, “QALYs and the Capability Approach,” Health Economics 14, no. 8 
(2005): 817–829; Han Bleichrodt and John Quiggin, “Capabilities as Menus: A Non-
welfarist Basis for QALY Evaluation,” Journal of Health Economics 32, no. 1 (2013): 
128–137. 
63 Paul Anand, “Capabilities and Health,” Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (2005): 299–303; 
Joanna Coast, Richard Smith, and Paula Lorgelly, “Should the Capability Approach Be 
Applied in Health Economics?” Health Economics 17, no. 6 (2008): 667–670. 
64 Ini Grewal et al., “Developing Attributes for a Generic Quality of Life Instrument for 
Older People: Preferences or Capabilities? Social Science and Medicine 62, no. 8 (2006): 
1891–1901; Ann Netten et al., “Outcome of Social Care for Adults: Developing a 
Preference Weighted Measure,” Health Technology Assessment 16, no. 16 (2012): 1–166. 
65 Paula Lorgelly et al., “Outcome Measurement in Economic Evaluation of Public 
Health Interventions: A Role for the Capability Approach?” International Journal of 
Environmental Research and Public Health 7, no. 5 (2010): 2274–2289. 
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The use of the capability approach directly in the health economics field has so far 
largely focused on the development of capability questionnaires (Table 15.1).69 Indeed, 
capability measures have been recommended for use in social care interventions in the 
most recent NICE economic evaluation reference case.70 Less progress has been made 
with regard to how such questionnaires, once fully developed and validated, can or 
should be used within an economic evaluation framework to aid priority-setting in health 
care for advisory bodies such as NICE. 
[INSERT TABLE 15.1 HERE] 
5. The Capability Approach as an Alternative Theoretical Basis for 
Economic Evaluation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
66 Judit Simon et al., “Operationalising the Capability Approach for Outcome 
Measurement in Mental Health Research,” Social Science & Medicine 98 (2013): 187–
196. 
67 Joanna Coast, “Strategies for the Economic Evaluation of End-of-Life Care: Making a 
Case for the Capability Approach,” Expert Review of Pharmacoeconomics & Outcomes 
Research 14, no. 4 (2014): 473–482. 
68 Philip Kinghorn, Angela Robinson, and Richard D. Smith, “Developing a Capability-
Based Questionnaire for Assessing Well-Being in Patients with Chronic Pain,” Social 
Indicators Research 120, no. 3 (2015): 897–916. 
69 For more details on these capability measures, see Joanna Coast, Philip Kinghorn, and 
Paul Mitchell, “The Development of Capability Measures in Health Economics: 
Opportunities, Challenges and Progress,” The Patient 8, no. 2 (2015): 119–126. 
70 NICE, Developing NICE Guidelines, 123. 
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The capability approach, most prominently developed by Amartya Sen and philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum, is an alternative theory of assessing individual’s advantage compared 
to the utilitarian tradition in welfare economics.71 The capability perspective has been 
identified by a number of researchers in the health field as a promising alternative,72 with 
some researchers conceptualizing the approach to health in particular.73 However, one of 
the difficulties with the capability approach is its underspecified nature (e.g., there is no 
explicit capability list appropriate for all policy decisions or common objective in 
                                                          
71 For the most current accounts of the capability approach, see Sen, The Idea; and 
Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach 
(London: Belknap, 2011). 
72 M. A. Verkerk, J. J. V. Busschbach, and E. D. Karssing, “Health-Related Quality of 
Life Research and the Capability Approach of Amartya Sen,” Quality of Life Research 
10, no. 1 (2001): 49–55; Anand, “Capabilities and Health,” 299–303; Coast et al., 
“Should the Capability,” 667–670; Iain Law and Heather Widdows, “Conceptualising 
Health: Insights from the Capability Approach,” Health Care Analysis 16, no. 4 (2008): 
303–314; Vikki A. Entwistle and Ian S. Watt, “Treating Patients as Persons: A 
Capabilities Approach to Support Delivery of Person-Centred Care,” American Journal 
of Bioethics 13, no. 8 (2013): 29–39. 
73 Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010); Sridhar Venkatapuram, Health Justice: An Argument from the Capabilities 
Approach (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2011). 
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capability evaluations).74 Although also viewed as an advantage in that the approach can 
be adapted to address particular policy concerns, this poses a challenge in offering a 
coherent practical application of the capability approach as an alternative, for example, to 
the current methods of economic evaluation in health care. Indeed, the capability 
approach has been used to justify a move away from traditional welfare economic 
practice toward extra-welfarist QALYs and DALYs. However, both QALYs and DALYs 
are primarily concerned with health as opposed to capability more generally.75 
A literature review of health studies attempting to measure capability found that 
none of the studies focused on health status alone to capture capability.76 The review of 
capability applications also found that although there is no consensus in the objective of 
capability-based evaluations, a large proportion of studies were concerned with an 
objective related to sufficiency of capabilities. Predominantly, this is due to the 
application of the capability approach in developing countries and the need to alleviate 
the insufficiency of basic capabilities in these impoverished scenarios. Following from 
                                                          
74 Robert Sugden, “Welfare, Resources and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality 
Reexamined by Amartya Sen,” Journal of Economic Literature 31, no. 4 (1993): 1947–
1962. 
75 Michael Drummond et al., “Towards a Consensus on the QALY,” Value in Health 12, 
no. s1 (2009): 31–35; Erik Nord, “Disability Weights in the Global Burden of Disease 
2010: Unclear Meaning and Overstatement of International Agreement,” Health Policy 
111, no. 1 (2013): 99–104. 
76 Paul M. Mitchell et al., “Applications of the capability approach in the health field: a 
literature review,” Social Indicators Research, in press. 
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this, research has led to the development of methods for generating capability outcomes 
reflective of the findings from the literature review of the objective of sufficiency of 
capabilities. 
5.1. Sufficient Capability Outcomes 
Drawing on methodology from the multidimensional poverty literature, which also draws 
its theoretical basis from the capability perspective,77 and health economic outcomes, we 
developed a methodology for calculating a composite measure of sufficient capability 
and time.78 Multidimensional poverty measurement is based on capturing multiple 
deprivations beyond income, and the approach uses a capability perspective to allow for a 
richer evaluative space on deprivation through a multidimensional lens. Using an 
example from the United States, Alkire and Foster demonstrate how focusing on income 
can give a distorted view of how poverty is portrayed within a community and who 
should be targeted by policy decisions.79 
The approach developed by us is based on an outcome called years of sufficient 
capability (YSC). Instead of focusing on the absolute gains of capability across a 
population (i.e., capability maximization), the YSC targets those who fall below a 
                                                          
77 Sabina Alkire and James Foster, “Counting and Multidimensional Poverty 
Measurement,” Journal of Public Economics 95, no. 7–8 (2011): 476–487. 
78 Paul M. Mitchell et al., “Assessing Sufficient Capability: A New Approach to 
Economic Evaluation,” Social Science & Medicine 139 (2015): 71-79.. 
79 Alkire and Foster, “Counting and Multidimensional,” 483–484. 
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threshold level of sufficient capability, with the aim being to improve capability to 
sufficient levels for those who are “capability poor.”80 
To demonstrate the use of YSC, we use a newly developed capability index for 
the general adult UK population, the ICEpop (Investigating Choice Experiments for the 
Preferences of Older People) CAPability measure for Adults (ICECAP-A).81 The 
ICECAP-A research team conducted qualitative research with members of the UK 
population to identify the most important capabilities for adults aged 18 years or older. 
Through thematic analysis of semistructured interviews with the UK general population, 
Al-Janabi and colleagues found five capabilities of most importance: 
Stability—“ability to feel settled and secure” 
Attachment—“an ability to have love, friendship, and support” 
Autonomy—“an ability to be independent” 
Achievement—“an ability to achieve and progress in life” 
Enjoyment—“an ability to experience enjoyment and pleasure” 
The ICECAP-A instrument was developed using these five attributes after an iterative 
process was used to test the understanding of questions, making sure that questions were 
interpreted in the same way as the original conceptual attributes developed. This resulted 
                                                          
80 Mitchell et al., “Assessing Sufficient Capability.” 
81 Hareth Al-Janabi, Terry N. Flynn, and Joanna Coast, “Development of a Self-Report 
Measure of Capability Wellbeing for Adults: The ICECAP-A,” Quality of Life Research 
21, no. 1 (2012): 167–176; Terry N. Flynn et al., “Scoring the ICECAP-A Capability 
Instrument: Estimation of a UK Population Tariff,” Health Economics 24, no. 3 (2015): 
258–269. 
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in five attributes of capability across four levels, ranging from no capability to full 
capability for each attribute (Table 15.2).82 The focus on capability in the ICECAP-A 
offers an alternative method for measuring the impact of health interventions to measures 
focused on health status. 
[INSERT TABLE 15.2 HERE] 
Values for the ICECAP-A capability index were generated for a representative 
sample of the UK adult population through a method called best–worst scaling. Best–
worst scaling presents scenarios to participants whereby, for the ICECAP-A, they are 
asked to state their most and least favored attribute from the five options presented to 
them (i.e., one from each attribute). For example, a person could be asked to choose the 
best and worst capability states when the ICECAP-A stability and attachment attributes 
are at their highest levels, autonomy is at the second highest level, and both achievement 
and enjoyment attributes are at their lowest levels. The best–worst scaling approach is 
favored by the ICECAP team due to the fact that this method of valuation does not 
necessarily rely on individual preferences because individuals are not directly asked to 
choose between two different scenarios.83 Values are anchored on a no capability–full 
capability (0–1) scale.84 To score 1, a person must have the highest levels of all ICECAP-
A attributes. To score 0, a person would need to have the lowest levels on each of the 
ICECAP-A attributes. 
                                                          
82 Al-Janabi et al., “The ICECAP-A,” 167–176. 
83 Joanna Coast et al., “Valuing the ICECAP Capability Index for Older People,” Social 
Science & Medicine 67, no. 5 (2008): 874–882. 
84 Flynn et al., “Scoring the ICECAP-A,” 258–269. 
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Because the ICECAP-A is a relatively new measure, limited studies have assessed 
its validity in patient groups. However, in a general adult UK population sample, 
capability differences were found between health and socioeconomic groups, showing 
that it can distinguish between groups that can be considered disadvantaged.85 The 
ICECAP-A has also been tested and has demonstrated reliability and face validity in the 
UK population.86 
In Table 15.2, we present the ICECAP-A questionnaire format and sufficient 
capability values, with sufficient capability thresholds set at “33333” and “22222” for 
illustration.87 What this means in practice is that for someone to be classed as having 
sufficient capability for threshold “33333,” he or she needs to answer the questionnaire 
level 3 or higher for each attribute to be classed as having sufficient capability (e.g., level 
3 for the ICECAP-A stability attribute would read, “I am able to feel settled and secure in 
many areas of my life”).88 
                                                          
85 Hareth Al-Janabi et al., “An Investigation of the Construct Validity of the ICECAP-A 
Capability Measure,” Quality of Life Research 22, no. 7 (2013): 1831–1840. 
86 Hareth Al-Janabi et al., “Test–Retest Reliability of Capability Measurement in the UK 
General Population,” Health Economics 24, no. 5 (2014): 625–630; Hareth Al-Janabi et 
al., “Can Capabilities Be Self-Reported? A Think Aloud Study,” Social Science & 
Medicine 87 (2013): 116–122. 
87 The original ICECAP-A valuation can be obtained from Flynn et al., “Scoring the 
ICECAP-A,” 265. 
88 For further details on the sufficient capability methodology, see Mitchell et al., 
“Assessing Sufficient Capability.” 
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5.2. Illustrative Example 
A decision-maker has to decide which of two mutually exclusive interventions to 
provide. Both interventions cost $1 million, and both treat 100 patients with similar 
sociodemographic characteristics. Intervention A is a medicine to improve a mild health 
problem and is clinically effective. Intervention B is an intervention that requires fewer 
hospital visits and stays for moderate health problems, although it has less clinical 
effectiveness than intervention A. The decision-maker is presented with information 
about health gain (arbitrarily estimated here for illustrative purposes to calculate a likely 
health state score on a measure such as EQ-5D), full capability gain, and sufficient 
capability gain. Intervention A improves the autonomy attribute on ICECAP-A by one 
level for 20 individuals previously at level 1 (i.e., from level 1 to level 2), 40 individuals 
previously at level 2, and 40 individuals previously at level 3. Intervention B improves 
the attachment attribute on ICECAP-A for 40 individuals previously at level 1, 40 
individuals at level 2, and 20 individuals at level 3. Intervention A improves its 
population health by twice as much as intervention B. We assume that these gains are 
kept for 1 year following intervention. The results of this illustrative example are 
presented in Table 15.3. 
[INSERT TABLE 15.3 HERE] 
The first matter to note is that in this example, we present a situation in which 
change in full and sufficient capability may differ from change in health status. Although 
this is unlikely to always be the case, this would be the first reason for considering 
moving from a focus on health status to capability because it may result in a change in 
how resources are allocated. The second matter is that in this example, all capability 
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outcomes point to intervention B. However, of most importance is the effect that focusing 
on sufficient capability could have on deciding what intervention to choose. Compared to 
considering full capability gain, using a threshold of “22222” means that improvements 
from level 1 to level 2 are valued much more highly, whereas improvements above level 
2 are not valued at all. In the case of intervention B, the higher valuation of the gains 
from level 1 to level 2 outweighs the fact that the gains by the other 60 individuals are 
now valued at 0, so the valuation of the overall gain increases from 0.09 to 0.11. This 
contrasts with intervention A, in which only 20 individuals’ gains are valued more 
highly, whereas 80 individuals’ gains are not weighted at all, with the result that the 
valuation of the overall gain decreases from 0.06 to 0.04. Therefore, one can imagine a 
situation in which two interventions focusing on capability may give different results if 
the focus is on maximum capability gain across a population versus a focus on the 
improvement of capability below a sufficient threshold. This illustrative example shows 
the potential for developing an approach for implementing capability measures in a 
framework to aid decision-making linked to an objective of sufficient capability. 
6. Discussion 
In this chapter, we highlighted how a sufficient capability approach may lead to different 
decisions being made with regard to the provision of health care interventions. The 
development of capability measures and the lack of reliance on health status as a sole 
indicator of welfare in capability studies indicate a need to move beyond measures 
focused purely on a person’s health state when adopting a capability perspective. 
Although no clear consensus exists with regard to the objective of a capability-based 
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evaluation, we argue that, based on how most studies are applying the approach89 and the 
need to offer a coherent alternative to welfare economic practice, there is appeal in some 
form of merging of ideas between concepts related to sufficiency and capability. We 
presented an example of how the use of the YSC outcome could lead to different 
decisions than those based on the current application of health QALY maximization. 
A number of criticisms have been made of the QALY approach. Many of these 
criticisms concern people who may be considered to be disadvantaged by taking a 
singular approach to assessing all interventions. Most of these critiques have been based 
on claims to different groups, most notably those who are most severely ill90 but also 
others.91 For example, NICE has given additional weight to interventions that meet end-
of-life criteria. Most tweaks to the QALY have been based on these claims, although 
health status has remained central within this calculation. Instead of tweaking the QALY, 
we argue that it is necessary to redesign the evaluative space to focus on individual 
capabilities. 
There has been one notable attempt in the health economics literature to align 
economic evaluation with a sufficiency criterion. Alan Williams argued for “fair innings” 
for everyone so that once one reaches one’s “fair innings” of years lived (Williams 
argued this to be 70 years), priority should be shifted to those who have yet to reach their 
                                                          
89 Mitchell et al., “Applications of the capability approach.” 
90 Nord, Cost–Value Analysis. 
91 Dolan et al., “QALY Maximisation,” 197–208. 
Pre-publication copy of Book Chapter in Fourie & Rid (2016) What is Enough? Sufficiency, Justice, and 
Health. Oxford University Press. Link to published version: https://goo.gl/2pHLGX 
 
sufficient number of years alive.92 Although we also adopt sufficiency principles, our 
approach is different. We suggest that interventions should be targeted at those who fall 
below a sufficient level of capability—the level of capability to live a life someone has 
reason to value—without making any further claims on who should be prioritized. 
How to define a sufficient threshold of capability needs to be considered further. 
One approach would be to conduct qualitative research using participatory methods to 
assign a sufficient threshold for a given population.93 Alternatively, quantitative research 
could be conducted to assign sufficient thresholds, similar to an approach taken in the 
poverty literature to assign “core poverty” thresholds.94 Although we have argued for and 
justified the rationale for adopting a sufficient capability approach, the same 
methodology could, of course, be used to reach a sufficient level of health. Such an 
approach would require a similar justification as the one presented for sufficient 
capability. Here, however, our attention focuses on people’s capabilities more broadly 
and setting an objective that is reflective of practical capability studies.95 
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Table 15.1 
Capability Measures Developed to Aid Health Decision-Making 
First Author Publication Year Population Targeted Interventions 
Coast 2008 Older people Health and social care 
Lorgelly 2008 General adult Public health 
Anand 2009 General adult Generic 
Al-Janabi 2012 General adult Generic 
Netten 2012 Older people Social care 
Simon 2013 Mental health Mental health 
Ferrer 2014 Obese/diabetic Physical activity and diet 
Sutton 2014 End of life Palliative care 
Kinghorn 2015 Chronic pain Chronic pain 
Table 15.2 
ICECAP-A Questions and Values: Sufficient Capability Thresholdsa 
 
Attribute “33333” “22222” 
 
Stability 
  4 I am able to feel settled and secure in all areas of my life. 0.2255 0.2294 
3 I am able to feel settled and secure in many areas of my life. 0.2255 0.2294 
2 I am able to feel settled and secure in a few areas of my life. 0.1193 0.2294 
1 I am unable to feel settled and secure in any areas of my life. –0.0009 –0.0018 
 
Attachment 
 4 I can have a lot of love, friendship, and support. 0.2225 0.2183 
3 I can have quite a lot of love, friendship, and support. 0.2225 0.2183 
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2 I can have a little love, friendship, and support. 0.1135 0.2183 
1 I cannot have any love, friendship, and support. –0.0281 –0.0541 
 
Autonomy 
 4 I am able to be completely independent. 0.1837 0.1894 
3 I am able to be independent in many things. 0.1837 0.1894 
2 I am able to be independent in a few things. 0.0984 0.1894 
1 I am unable at all to be independent. 0.0074 0.0143 
 
Achievement 
 4 I can achieve and progress in all aspects of my life. 0.1870 0.2059 
3 I can achieve and progress in many aspects of my life. 0.1870 0.2059 
2 I can achieve and progress in a few aspects of my life. 0.1070 0.2059 
1 I cannot achieve and progress in any aspects of my life. 0.0247 0.0476 
 
Enjoyment 
 4 I can have a lot of enjoyment and pleasure. 0.1813 0.1570 
3 I can have quite a lot of enjoyment and pleasure. 0.1813 0.1570 
2 I can have a little enjoyment and pleasure. 0.0816 0.1570 
1 I cannot have any enjoyment and pleasure. –0.0031 –0.0059 
aTo see the original ICECAP-A questionnaire layout, see Al-Janabi, Hareth, Terry N. Flynn, and Joanna 
Coast, “Development of a Self-Report Measure of Capability Wellbeing for Adults: The ICECAP-A,” 
Quality of Life Research 21, no. 1 (2012): 167–176. 
Table 15.3 
Comparing Health Gain, Capability Gain, and Sufficient Capability Outcomesa 
Benefit Treatment A Treatment B 
Health gain 0.10 0.05 
Capability gain 0.06 0.09 
Threshold “33333” 0.05 0.10 
Threshold “22222” 0.04 0.11 
aNumbers in italics represent optimum strategy based on different objectives. 
